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THE FINANCIAL ASPECT OF ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
UNDER RULE 23(a)(4): A PREREQUISITE TO CLASS
CERTIFICATION?
JANICE A. KAYE* AND DONALD F. SINEX*
This article examines the financial implications of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) which requires that the repre-
sentative for a class action provide fair and adequate representa-
tion in an adjudication of the class' rights. The authors trace the
development in case law of the 23(a)(4) financial condition con-
siderations. They then examine the tensions which arise as a
result of imposition of heavy financial responsibilities on the class
plaintiff under 23(a)(4). Requiring the prospective plaintiff to
prove financial competence serves to provide due process and
protection for the rights of absent class members but it may also
preclude a plaintiff from bringing the suit at all. The authors
suggest possible directions for legislative reform and recommend
further legislative consideration of resolution of the competing
objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of fair and adequate representation for absent
class members presented by the present Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(a)(4) stems from the fact that the rule requires that the
judgment have a binding effect on all members of the class.' No
subsequent suit based on issues of law or fact adjudicated in the
class action may be brought by any member of the class who has
not excluded himself from the effect of the judgment through notice
to the court pursuant to 23(c)(2)(A).2 This foreclosure of rights by
* Former member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) provides "the judgment, whether favor-
able or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion."
2. This provision advises a class member that "the court will exclude him from the class
if he so requests by a specified date."
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adjudication in one lawsuit means that the courts must assure
absent class members adequate representation in that action; the
absent class member will have no further judicial recourse. More-
over, the requirement of adequate representation reflects the fact
that the absent class members will probably not take any part in
the prosecution of the action itself.
This need to protect class members, due to preclusion of further
action on their part, was not always a vital consideration of the
federal judiciary. Until the adoption of the present rule in 1966, the
applicable rules and cases permitted an absent class member to
bring a subsequent suit, irrespective of the judgment applicable to
the class. The orginal class action rule, Federal Equity Rule 48, in
force between 1842 and 1912, specifically stated that "the decree
shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of the absent
parties."3
The sentence regarding the nonbinding effect of the judgment
was removed in 1912 with the adoption of Equity Rule 38,1 but the
confusion continued. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, the
Court clearly held that such judgments would be binding on all class
members: "If the federal courts are to have the jurisdiction in class
suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree when rendered
must bind all of the class properly represented." 5 This decision was
later weakened by Christopher v. Brusselback' which limited the
binding effect of judgments on absentee class members to covering
only the absentees' interests in property within the jurisdiction of
the court.
With the adoption of the original rule 23 in 1938, the problem
still was not clearly resolved. The rule divided class actions into
three categories,7 and one of these categories, the "spurious" class
3. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1751, at 508 n.22
(1972).
4. Id. at 509.
5. 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
6. 302 U.S. 500 (1938).
7. The three classes were described in rule 23(a) according to the nature of the right to
be enforced:
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled
to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
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action, was often considered a mere permissive joinder device, so
judgment bound only those parties.named on the record.'
As rewritten in 1966, rule 23 resolves the problem by abolishing
the categorical distinctions and by clearly stating that the judgment
will be binding on those class members who have not specifically
excluded themselves from the class.' However, since the absent
class member can no longer protect himself by resorting to separate
litigation unless he has specifically excluded himself, the court now
faces the task of insuring that his interests will be protected by the
class representative.'"
Federal courts have indicated that unless there is assurance
that the action will be prosecuted forthrightly and vigorously, the
rights of absent class members will be considered inadequately pro-
tected. I An important factor to consider, therefore, is the ability of
the representative party to pay the costs of the action, as this bears
directly on how strenuously the action will be prosecuted. Although
the lower federal courts have begun to consider financial capability
in connection with adequate representation, they have not provided
a clear standard as to the extent of financial resources necessary to
meet the responsibility of adequate protection. There has also been
no conclusive judicial decision establishing a regular procedure for
discovery into the availability of such funds.
The landmark decision which first established guidelines as to
financial responsibilities required of the class plaintiff is Eisen v.
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
C. WRIOHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1752, at 512. These three categories came to be known
as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class actions, respectively. See § 1752 for a discussion
of the confusion caused by the attempts to pigeonhole actions into these categories.
8. In Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the court said that
in such an action "joinder is a matter of economy and efficiency on the part of courts and
parties-an avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. . . . The joinder was and is a matter of
discretion in the trial court.' See also Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
9. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states: "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if. . . (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."
11. The ability of the class plaintiff to represent the members of the class is considered
an essential prerequisite to insuring due process for the absent members of the class. See
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940); Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969).
See also Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98 (D. Colo. 1971); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Carlisle & Jacquelin.2 This case held that under 23(c)(2)"3 a class
representative must bear the costs of giving notice of the suit to all
reasonably identifiable members of the class. Rule 23(c)(2) simply
requires that notice be directed to absent class members. The Court
in Eisen IV set down that the cost of such notice should be born by
the class representative. The Court rejected a notion of "mini-
hearings" to determine who should bear the cost of notice as beyond
the scope of the rule; 4 the Court also refused to shift the duty to
pay 23(c)(2) costs to the defendant. By requiring the class represent-
ative to pay notice costs under rule 23(c)(2), the Eisen IV Court
simultaneously underscored the protective nature of the role of class
representative and annexed financial responsibilities to that role.
This conception of the role of class representative, although
developed under a construction of 23(c)(2), may logically be ex-
tended to support the contention that 23(a)(4), through its fair and
adequate representation requirement, also imposes financial res-
ponsibilities on the class representative. This extension of the Eisen
IV decision has been made by lower federal courts 5 in opinions
indicating that rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representative
be able to pay the cost of prosecuting the entire suit.
The implications of this interpretation of 23 (a)(4) for would-
be class representatives and for class suits in general are examined
in this article.
II. EvOLUTION OF FINANCIAL INQUIRY
Citing the rulings in Eisen III and Eisen IV as precedent for the
proposition that rule 23 requires a financially capable class repre-
sentative, defendants in a few recent class action suits have suc-
ceeded, at least at the lower federal court level, in arguing against
12. 417 U.S. 156 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Eisen IV].
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides, in part: "In any class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practica-
ble under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort."
14. This aspect of the case was explicitly dealt with by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that the district court had no authority to conduct
a preliminary hearing on the merits for the purpose of allocating costs. 479 F.2d 1005 (1973)
Ihereinafter referred to as Eisen 1I1].
15. See, e.g., National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F. Supp. 620,
636-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372, 377-78 (S.D. Fla.
1973); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 433-34 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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certification of a class where the representative was either unwilling
or unable to finance the costs of the suit.' Although in an obfus-
cated form, the theory presented in each case was that a representa-
tive who is not able to afford the costs of the class suit-including
the sometimes immense costs of discovery-jeopardizes the inter-
ests of the absent class members by granting the generally affluent
corporate defendants an adversarial advantage. If the defendants
have vastly greater financial resources than the class plaintiffs, the
litigation becomes one-sided; the prosecution of the suit is almost
automatically rendered less effective than its defense. This theory,
purporting to protect absent class members, was put forth by defen-
dants for their own purposes, specifically in hopes of preventing
class certification. Nonetheless, it brought before the courts the
legitimate issue of possible inadequacy of representation due to the
representative plaintiff's insufficiency of funding.
One of the first cases to present the problem for judicial
solution involved separate antitrust actions consolidated for treat-
ment of the motions for certification of the classes.' 7 The first action
considered was a suit against publishers for discrimination in adver-
tising practices.6 The court concluded that under rule 23(a)(4), and
16. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
17. Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
18. This was an action by Ambook Enterprises against Time, Inc. The first amended
complaint alleged that the action was being brought on behalf of all "producers, wholesalers
and retailers of goods and services of interstate commerce in the United States who advertise
in publications." Id. at 480. The class thus defined was estimated at 1 million persons. The
plaintiffs complained that the publisher defendants, including Time, Inc., had established
dual rate structures for the sale of advertising in their publications. According to this system,
advertising agencies would obtain a 15 percent commission from the publishers, whereas
those advertisers purchasing directly from the publishers do not receive this commission. Id.
at 480. The purpose of the rate structure was allegedly to coerce the purchase of advertising
agency services and to fix a price for services of advertising agencies to their clients equal to
17.6 percent of the price charged by publishers. An injunction and damages were sought; the
damage claim exceeded $1 billion.
After consolidation, plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint, although all the counts
were grounded on the same basic claim concerning the dual rate system. The amendment
based the purported violations squarely on action prohibited by the Sherman Act, alleging
that the scheme resulted from combination and conspiracy, and that the New York Times
Company had attempted to monopolize with respect to advertising in the New York area.
Further claims included alleged price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
The class was regrouped into those seeking damages arid those desiring injunctive relief.
The number of persons in the former class totaled about 5,500 whereas the proposed class for
injunctive relief amounted to about I million persons.
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particularly because of the binding effect of a judgment under rule
23, the court must insure that the representative party is capable
of asserting the interests of the absent class members with vigor and
forthrightness." The court accepted the pragmatic contention that
adequacy of representation may be highly correlative to sufficiency
of funding. With regard to this aspect of the case, it was found that
the representative was in such financial straits that "there [was]
no assurance that [it was] in a position to carry on class litigation
in [that] court in a responsible and vigorous manner."' " The court
denied class certification on grounds of the representative's appar-
ent inability to represent the class; this inability was traced par-
tially to the representative's poor financial condition."
In the second antitrust action,22 the plaintiff, National Auto
Brokers Corporation, ("Nabcor,"), was considered unfit to represent
the class due to its lack of financial stability. In that case, the
corporate coffer was seriously depleted. "At a hearing. . . the presi-
dent of Nabcor indicated that Nabcor was almost out of money and
was in danger of going out of business. The president of Nabcor
indicated that he had put $100,000 of his own money into the com-
pany, which was then almost gone."" In a later opinion involving
19. 60 F.R.D. at 486-87. Citing Eisen IV, the court further stated:
Under the new Rule 23, and particularly because of the res judicata effects of
judgments under the rule, a court must carefully scrutinize the adequacy of repre-
sentation in all classactions. . . . In general, the primary criterion is the forth-
rightness and vigor with which the representative party can be expected to assert
the interests of the members of the class.
Id. (citations omitted).
20. 60 F.R.D. at 487. Representative Ambook was out of business and in the process of
liquidating, and had commenced action against Time, Inc. only after failing to receive a
capital investment from Time. Moreover, Ambook had recently suffered a default judgment
in Ohio proceedings which would further deplete available resources.
21. Id. at 488. The court evaluated the ability of Ambook to represent the class based
on its poor financial status, and only subsequently stated that even if Ambook were adequate
in that capacity, its failure to assert a claim typical of the class would bar it from representa-
tion.
22. National Auto Brokers v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
23. Id. at 493-94. At this point in the litigation, the court found that Nabcor was main-
taining itself by land speculation in the Poconos, and that its overall condition was "bleak."
Id. at 494.
The factual background of this suit dealt with basically the same claim as the Ambook
action. The complaint was brought on behalf of persons who had placed advertising during
the four years prior to commencement of the action directly with a newspaper in the United
States, and who had not received the agency discount. Treble damages, declaratory judg-




another aspect of the same case,"* "Nabcor IT," the federal district
court elaborated in more detail on the relationship between finan-
cial condition and ability to represent adequately. The court's anal-
ysis in Nabcor H indicated that since financial insolvency will have
an adverse effect upon the representative's ability to render the
required adequate representation, the court will carefully scrutinize
the plaintiff's financial condition."2 Noting that in the instant case
the class plaintiff had suffered financial losses during the previous
three years and had a negative balance in its working capital ac-
count, with no cash reserves, the court concluded that this poor
financial state precluded a finding that the class plaintiff could
adequately represent the absent members' interests."6 Although the
court did not specify the amount of money necessary to assume
adequate representation, the opinion indicated that the representa-
tive had already expended approximately $38,000.27 Nonetheless,
the court concluded that the plaintiff, possessing limited funds and
confronting mounting additional costs of suit, could not realistically
expect to pay these costs and thereby protect the interests of the
class.2" Thus, the opinion in Nabcor II clearly establishes a high
degree of correlation between the ability to pay the costs of properly
prosecuting the class suit and adequacy of representation as re-
quired by 23(a)(4).
24. National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F! Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), [hereinafter referred to as Nabcor Ill. While the case discussed t note 19 supra dealt
with alleged antitrust violations due to dual advertising rates, the instant case concerned
purported discrimination by automobile manufacturers in their dealings with Nabcor, an
automobile broker, and its franchisees. Nabcor contended that the auto manufacturers dis-
criminated in favor of long term leasing companies by refunding advertising contributions to
them, and not to Nabcor, and by making available to these concerns certain other benefits,
such as warranty programs and purchase price rebates.
25. Id. at 637-38.
26. Id. at 638. The record revealed that Nabcor had an operating loss of $82,000 on Sales
of $221,000 and a total loss of $183,651 for the 9 months ending October 31, 1971. Nabcor's
operating loss for the six months ending July 31, 1972 was $87,000 and the company had a
total loss of $96,000 on sales of $216,000. Nabcor had a negative working capital balance of
$212,000 as of July 31, 1972, and a negative cash balance of $1,472 as of March 8, 1973.
Furthermore, the company had a $150,000 default judgment entered against it in Ohio court
proceedings based on a promissory note.
27. Id.
28. Nabcor's attorney contended that Nabcor had proved its ability as an adequate
representative by conducting the litigation thus far. The court rejected this argument, stating
that the record was not indicative "because the class action aspects of the litigation have not
really begun." Id.
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Another case significant in the development of a financial capa-
bility requirement under rule 23(a)(4) was Ralston v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G.2 ' The plaintiff in Ralston filed a motion to certify an
action on behalf of some 18,000 members who had allegedly pur-
chased Volkswagen automobiles from Volkswagen dealers at "fixed"
prices. :"' The court denied the motion on the grounds that the claims
were not typical and the action was not manageable in its class
form. Refusal to certify the suit was based on the additional reason
that the representatives were financially weak advocates. The
Ralston court had assessed the financial state of the representatives
and found that they had a total of $15,000 available for use in
prosecuting the class suit. The court estimated that pretrial notice
costs would be approximately $4,000. Expenses incurred by plain-
tiff's counsel and discovery costs had already totalled $3,000. There-
fore, plaintiffs had thus far committed $7,000, leaving them with
approximately $8,000 with which to satisfy any future costs. The
court dismissed the suggestion that this amount would suffice to
prosecute the matter properly, concluding "that the probable ex-
pense of developing acceptable evidence necessary to present the
merits of the case would exceed substantially the amount the named
plaintiffs have at their disposal."'" The representatives' lack of re-
sources to cover the entire cost of the class suit convinced the court
that the requirements of rule 23(a)(4) had not been satisfied. Over
the representatives' objections that Eisen IV mandated only the
payment of notice costs, the Ralston court dismissed the action,
noting the necessity that the representative be able to pay for the
entire suit. "In order adquately and fairly to represent the interests
of the class, the named plaintiffs must sustain the burden of show-
ing that their resources are adequate to pursue this lawsuit to com-
pletion, even in the absence of any additional financial contribu-
tions from members of the purported class."32 The opinion refers to
29. 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
30. Id. at 429. The complaint alleged that multiple corporate defendants, consisting of
the manufacturer, the importer, a regional distributor, and dealers of new Volkswagens, had
conspired to maintain the price of new Volkswagens at an artificially inflated level by resale
price maintenance agreements setting prices from which dealers were forbidden to deviate.
Id. at 428.
31. Id. at 434.
32. Id. at 433.
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the payment of the costs of notice as merely "the tip of the ice-
berg.'
The court concluded that if the representative's ability to per-
form his duty as mandated by rule 23(a)(4) is not assured at the
outset of litigation, that plaintiff, regardless of his personal stake in
the outcome, must not be allowed to present the claims of other
members. Specifically stating that "the court should allow such
representation only upon a firm foundation that the named
plaintiffs are willing and financially able to shoulder that burden, 
34
the court went on to point out that demonstration of this ability
must take place at the beginning of the lawsuit. "Such a lawsuit
should never be undertaken in the hope that at some future date the
existence of a class will aid the plaintiffs in carrying the case to
completion, because nobody knows whether other unidentified
members of the class are able or willing to finance the action."3"
In discussing adequate representation in another antitrust suit,
P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp.,31 the court again made evalua-
tion of the financial resources available for prosecution of the suit a
prerequisite of certification. In its examination of the plaintiffs'
funding, the court stressed that the "inherent expense of conducting
discovery in a complicated antitrust case such as this ' 37 is an impor-
tant factor in determining the amount of money the representatives
would need to meet their statutory obligation. Deposition of the
representatives revealed that they were unaware of the costs in-
volved in such a suit and would not be willing to invest the huge
sums necessary for adequate prosecution of the action .3 Further-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 434.
35. Id.
36. 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973). P.D.Q. involved consolidation of two antitrust cases
for pretrial proceedings. Complaints in these suits alleged Sherman Act and Clayton Act
violations by the defendant and its dealers in conspiring to fix retail prices for Datsuns,
refraining from selling through brokers and discount houses, and allocating marketing territo-
ries. The class, as originally proposed, consisted of all those who had purchased Datsuns in
the United States, its territories, and Puerto Rico, a total of approximately 630,000 persons.
The court limited this number by including only purchasers of Datsuns from July 17, 1968
to July 17, 1972 who purchased the automobiles in either New York County, New York or
Dade County, Florida.
37. Id. at 377.
38. Id. at 377-78.
The court drew this conclusion from the depositions of the plaintiffs quoted in note 4 of
the opinion as follows:
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more, the court estimated that pretrial expenditures would exceed
$10,000 and that when notice costs were added, the total amount
necessary would vary between $25,000 and $250,000, depending
upon the size of class permitted."' Thus, certification, which ulti-
mately was granted in P.D. Q., after the class size was considerably
reduced, was dependent on assurances to the court that this amount
could be furnished, thereby linking adequate protection with finan-
cial capability.
To recapitulate, according to this line of cases, the representa-
tive, irrespective of any personal claim, is not entitled to represent
others in class suits if the court determines that he is financially
unable to meet the heavy responsibility set down for him in rule
23(a)(4). The exact amount of money needed to satisfy the rule
depends upon the particular factual situation. In the preceding dis-
cussion, all the cases involved large classes consisting of thousands
of plaintiffs, with damage claims aggregating millions of dollars.
Moreover, P.D.Q., Ralston, and Nabcor were concerned not only
with huge classes, but also with complex antitrust litigation. Shoul-
dering the economic burden clearly becomes more onerous as the
number of persons to be represented and the complexity of the
litigation increases. In such cases, the courts have rightfully im-
posed a heavy burden regarding financial ability to prosecute.
Q. Are you aware of the fact that your attorney in bringing this suit has sought
to bring a class action?
A. Yes, he told me that.
Q. Are you prepared to pay for a class action if called upon?
A. No.
Q. Suppose it were to cost you $100,000 to pull a figure out of the air?
A. I couldn't afford that.
Q. Could you afford $10,000?
A. I certainly wouldn't want to.
The deposition of the other plaintiff revealed the following:
Q. Has anybody told you about the possibility that you may have to pay the
expenses of notifying the class in this action?
A. No sir.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Q. Suppose your company needed $100,000 to pay the costs of prosecuting this
action; would that money be available?
A. No sir.
Q. Would you borrow to pay the costs of this action?
A. No, sir.
39. Id. at 378.
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When a small number of persons is involved in class litigation,
courts should not be as concerned with scrutiny of the representa-
tive's financial abilities since the economic exigencies will be less
rigorous. This fact does not, however, completely erase the court's
duty to assure itself that the plaintiff can afford to represent the
small class. Because of the variants such as class size and complex-
ity of litigation, the examination of financial capability should be
taken on a case by case basis, without rigid rules defining the
amount necessary to sustain certification on the adequate represen-
tation issue. Attachment of financial responsibilities to the fair and
adequate representation mandate of 23(a)(4) seeks to afford protec-
tion to absent class members. However, a dogmatically inflexible
application of the financial capability requirement could in itself be
detrimental to the rights of class members by making certification
of any class almost impossible.
An attempt to address this problem was made by the court in
Sanderson v. Winner.'" There, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that the
action could not be maintained as a class suit since the funds avail-
able to the representatives for prosecuting the suit were insufficient
under the rationale set forth in Ralston and P.D. Q. "Defendants
considered it important to ascertain whether plaintiffs were able to
pay all of the costs in the litigation including extensive depositions.
We fail to see relevancy in these inquiries particularly with respect
to in limine inquiry as to whether a class action is to be allowed."',
The Tenth Circuit stated that the rule 23(a)(4) requirement of
adequate representation and consequently the issue of the plaintiffs'
financial condition is not of paramount importance in an action
involving a relatively small class:
We are aware that some lower court decisions have considered the
plaintiff's ability to pay as relevant and proper in the present
context. However, in both of these cases in which antitrust viola-
tions were alleged, the plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all
40. 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975). Plaintiffs were
seeking to bring an antitrust action against the Nissan Corp. for engaging in alleged unlawful
conspiracy with the dealerships to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. They sought issuance
of writs of mandamus and prohibition directing the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado to vacate discovery orders requiring production of income tax returns,
financial documents, and agreements with attorneys relating to their fees. Id. at 478.
41. Id. at 479.
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new car purchasers in the United States. Thus, there was legiti-
mate concern about the ability of the plaintiffs to successfully
lead a class of this magnitude. Also, the court in Ralston was
concerned about its ability to manage the class. The mentioned
considerations are not present here.42
The court ostensibly reasoned that because of the small size of the
class, there would be less chance of inadequate representation due
to financial weakness. Although this conclusion is undoubtedly
logical, the court should not have dispensed with the financial
prerequisite entirely. While drawing distinctions between small
and large classes may be relevant, it is submitted that the opinion
of the Tenth Circuit in Sanderson was an incorrect application of
rule 23 because of its refusal to allow any examination of the
representative's financial condition. Whether the class is small or
large, the representative stands in for absent members, and his
statutory duty is to represent these members-be they one or one
million in number-in a fair and adequate manner. The Tenth Cir-
cuit did not discuss this point, although the court did recognize that
financial condition is relevant in the determination of the represent-
ative's ability to prosecute a larger class suit.,3 It is unfounded for
the court to indicate that the relevancy of the inquiry decreases as
class size decreases. It is not that the relevancy of the inquiry into
the representative's financial condition decreases in importance
when the class is small, but rather, that the resources which must
be shown to be available to assure adequate representation of the
small class decrease in extent. Thus, it is suggested that the class
representative in the Sanderson case should have been required to
show a degree of financial resources which would comport with the
needs of the small class he sought to represent. A complete failure
to require any showing of financial status seems to ignore the ade-
quate representation mandate, or has the effect of making it applic-
able only to the kinds of large classes found in the P.D. Q., Ralston,
and Nabcor cases. Certainly the absent class member in a small
class action has a right of adequate representation equal to that of
his counterpart who is a member of a large class. Sanderson under-
mines the intended statutory protection for absent class members




by its refusal to allow inquiry into the financial condition of the
representative.
It seems that an overriding concern of the Tenth Circuit in
reaching its decision in Sanderson was the rich-poor plaintiff dichot-
omy. " The court stated: "Ordinarily courts do not inquire into the
financial responsibility of litigants. We generally eschew the ques-
tion whether litigants are rich or poor. Instead, we address ourselves
to the merits of the litigation."45 The court believed that a poor
plaintiff has as much right to access to the federal courts as a rich
one. In class actions, however, the rich-poor distinction is critically
important. The representative does not simply present a sole claim
but attempts to represent others in the presentation of their claims
as well. Whether a single plaintiff has funds to prosecute his claim
is of no concern to the courts. If he does not have such funds, the
single plaintiff suffers alone; no one else is harmed. In a class suit,
however, if there is an insufficiency of funds, the absent class mem-
bers, as well as the representative, may be seriously harmed in that
ineffective presentation of the claim may result in an adverse judg-
ment binding on all class members. A distinction between rich and
poor plaintiffs is therefore at least relevant, if not necessary, in class
suits. Rule 23(a)(4) recognizes the import of the distinction by spe-
cifically requiring adequate representation; thus it is contended
that the court in Sanderson erred when it relied on a rich-poor
argument to deny discovery into the financial status of the repre-
sentatives.
The lines of cases prior to Sanderson, including Ralston,
P.D.Q., and Nabcor, considered financial capability an important
factor in the determination of adequacy. However, Sanderson dis-
tinguished those cases, all of which involved large classes, and held
that financial capability is not a factor where the class involved is
small. This distinction, albeit erroneous, could be followed in the
future in order to avoid financial examination. It is more likely,
however, that if Sanderson is accepted at all by the other circuits,
it will be limited to its facts, thereby barring discovery into financial
capability only when small classes are involved. Any extension of
Sanderson that might bar financial consideration in a case involving
a large class and complex litigation will assuredly undermine the
44. Id. at 479.
45. Id.
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rule 23(a)(4) requirement of adequacy of representation.
Regardless of future consideration of Sanderson, the cases re-
quiring such inquiry necessitate an examination of the amount of
funding sufficient for a determination that statutory requirements
have been met.
III. MONETARY REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 23
The demonstration of financial capability which the court
should require of a class plaintiff in satisfaction of rule 23(a)(4)
should center on the sum the court considers necessary to prosecute
the class claim effectively." The cost factors deemed vital in prose-
cution of a suit in general include discovery, attorney's fees, court
costs, and notice.47 The class representative is, of course, opposed
to expanding the amount needed to bring the class suit beyond the
single cost of giving notice to the members of the class as explicitly
required by Eisen IV." The Supreme Court in Eisen IV was, how-
46. The federal district court in Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 433
(W. D. Mo. 1973) flatly held:
In order adequately and fairly to represent the interests of the class, the named
[class] plaintiffs must sustain the burden of showing their resources are adequate
to pursue this lawsuit to completion ...
The apparent meaning of the words "to completion" is that the class representative should
pay all costs incurred while developing and preparing the claim for final adjudication. See
P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
47. The most expensive items, of course, are discovery and attorney's fees, The cost of
notice is mandated by Eisen IV. Court costs, which include fees of the clerk and marshall,
etc., are generally inconsequential and will not be discussed further. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(1970). In addition, under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d), costs are generally awarded to the prevailing
party. However, except in rare circumstances, the costs so awarded do not include discovery
and attorney's fee costs. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
2666.
48. It is interesting to note that the cost of notice may include many elements. See, e.g.,
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 546-47 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
496 F. 2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974), which reveals the extent of notice costs involved in that case:
There remains for us to consider the form, content, and manner of dissemi-
nating the notice. ...
. . . With respect to those who will be sent regular monthly billings, the
plaintiff will supply to the defendant a sufficient number of notices and un-
stamped, self-addressed return envelopes for inclusion in the monthly billings.
The plaintiff will bear the burden of the cost of the production of the notice and
the purchase of the return envelopes. The plaintiff, further, will reimburse the
defendant for the cost of the labor to stuff such notices and return envelopes in
with the defendant's monthly billings. With respect to those who will not be sent
regular monthly billings, the defendants will produce for the plaintiff, at the cost
of the plaintiff, address labels. . . . [Tihe plaintiff will be responsible for . . .
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ever, primarily concerned with notice as satisfying rule 23(c)(2) and
did not extensively concern itself with the concept of financial con-
dition as related to adequate representation pursuant to 23(a)(4).11
Thus, the question of whether or not the class representative must
pay costs other than notice should be analyzed in light of the reason-
ing of Eisen IV, but in no event is the ultimate answer limited by
that case.
The Eisen IV Court believed that since procedural due process
mandated fair notice to the absent members, the class representa-
tive should bear that cost "as part of the ordinary burden of financ-
ing his suit."5 Moreover, the Court stated that procedural due pro-
cess is satisfied only if the class plaintiff is an adequate representa-
tive and if the aforementioned notice is given to the class." The
Eisen IV Court did not address the 23(a)(4) issue, but since the
Court required the plaintiff to pay the cost of notice to satisfy the
due process requirement embodied in 23(c)(2), it seems unwar-
ranted to think that the Eisen IV decision can be interpreted as
specifically limiting the class plaintiff's financial responsibility to
notice costs. The requirements of the due process clause and rule
23(a)(4) are equally applicable throughout the course of class litiga-
tion.52 The court should require the class representative to conform
to these requirements at all stages of the suit. Thus, if the Eisen IV
Court required the payment of notice at the outset to insure due
process, then it seems consistent for the Court to order the payment
of other costs necessary to develop the case effectively. These latter
costs also ensure due process. The class plaintiff should therefore be
subject, before certification, to court determination of financial cap-
ability to pay the other costs which will be incurred if the class suit
is vigorously pursued. Clearly, such a requirement is as "ordinary
mailing [the notices] .. .to the members of the class who will not be sent
regular monthly billings, including those who are no longer Carte Blanche card-
holders.
49. The Supreme Court of the United States held that in a 23(b)(3) class suit, the class
representative, to satisfy procedural due process, must bear the cost of notice to the members
of the class. 417 U.S. at 177.
50. 417 U.S. at 179.
51. Id. at 176-77.
52. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), where the Fifth Circuit
set aside the trial court's judgment on the grounds that the requirement of adequate represen-
tation was not satisfied.
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[a] burden of financing [the] suit" as the cost of notice.,'
A rule that the class plaintiff be required to pay the cost of the
class suit as insurance against inadequate representation takes on
further merit when the items of cost are put into perspective. The
major costs of suit that the class plaintiff should finance are discov-
ery and attorney's fees. These two expenses of the suit bear directly
on how effectively the matter will be pursued and are therefore
within the parameters of rule 23(a)(4).
The use of discovery is crucial to a full exploitation of the facts
underlying any matter in litigation. 4 The strength of the presenta-
tion of the case depends primarily on the scope of discovery em-
ployed by the litigant to gather facts and develop the issues. In view
of this fact, a restricted use of discovery impairs the effectiveness
of the pregontation of the case, thereby reducing the chances for
successful court action not only for one plaintiff, but possibly for
hundreds of absent class members. Thus, if the class plaintiff is not
thoroughly prepared, the rights of the absent members are not ade-
quately protected as required by rule 23(a)(4).-5 Moreover, when a
class plaintiff is unable to finance the cost of discovery, the adver-
sarial advantage discussed earlier accrues to the generally more
affluent corporate defendants. The resultant one-sidedness of the
litigation, coupled with the statutory requirement of adequate rep-
resentation, dictate that the class plaintiff pay such costs of discov-
ery as are needed to develop the claim fully.
The other element of cost which must be analyzed to decide
whether rule 23(a)(4) requires its payment by the class plaintiff is
attorney's fees. The conclusion drawn with respect to the payment
of discovery costs does not apply to the question of the payment of
attorney's fees. In fact, a careful consideration of those situations in
which the class plaintiff is unable to prepay the fee compels a con-
trary conclusion. Generally, there are two situations where an attor-
53. 417 U.S. at 179. Accord, King v. Sharp, 63 F.R.D. 60 (N.D. Tex. 1974); FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(4).
54. The importance of employing full discovery in class actions, and consequently, the
ability to pay its cost, was discussed tersely in P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D.
372, 377 (S.D. Fla. 1973): "Also to be considered is the inherent expense of conducting
discovery in a complicated antitrust case such as this, especially when that discovery program
is sure to include exhaustive examination of the defendant's documents." The court then
stated that failure to undertake this degree of discovery can jeopardize the likelihood of the
class action's success.
55. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ney will represent a class without advance payment. One is where
the attorney accepts the case on a contingency fee arrangement, and
the other is where the class claim is predicated on a statute author-
izing the recovery of attorney's fees. 6
In either situation, the attorney has evaluated the facts and
concluded that the class claim is meritorious and that consequently
the chances of recovery are high. The potential award of reasonable
attorney's fees or a percentage of the recovery in contingency cases
seems to be sufficient incentive to the attorney to assure the court
that he will vigorously prosecute the matter. Accordingly, there is
no overriding reason for the court to require the prepayment of
attorney's fees. However, where neither a contingency fee arrange-
ment nor statutory recovery of attorney's fees is possible, the class
representative must also be prepared to pay the class's attorney.
The above analysis indicates that under 23(a)(4) the represent-
ative must at least be able to pay the discovery costs of the suit, and,
in some instances, attorney's fees as well. The next question is
whether the representative may expect contributions from the class.
There is no valid objection to contributions from the class to defray
the expenses of the suit. In fact, this practice is salutary since the
absent members benefit from an effective prosecution of the case.
The contributions, however, must be made prior to the time the
motion to certify the class is presented to the court. 7 Otherwise, the
court would be unable to accertain the extent of resources available
to prosecute the action. A class suit should never be undertaken in
the hope that at some future date the members of a class will aid
the representative in carrying the case to completion; it is uncertain
whether unidentified members of the class are able or willing to
contribute to financing the class suit. Consequently, if a plaintiff
56. An example of statutory recovery of attorney's fees is an action brought pursuant to
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (Supp. V, 1975). As to those situations where
the attorney may enter into a contingency fee arrangement, see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 and Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-20.
57. The federal district court in Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 433
(W.D. Mo. 1973), remarked that the class plaintiff must show he can pay the costs of the
class suit "even in the absence of any additional financial contributions from members of the
purported class." Moreover, the court held that such contributions, if any, must be made
available to the class plaintiff before the suit is commenced. Id. at 434.
As an alternative to the class contribution method of financing, the attorney representing
the class in Nabcor has suggested a public stock offering. The proceeds from the sale of stock
would be used to cover the class suit expenses. TIME, April 26, 1976, at 46.
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desires monetary contribution from the class, he should undertake
solicitation as soon as possible and certainly prior to the time certifi-
cation of the class is requested from the court. Otherwise, the court
will not consider the finances of the class but will instead rest its
decision regarding the financial aspects of adequate representation
on the financial capability of the class representative alone.
IV. ADVANCEMENT OF COSTS BY THE ATTORNEY
Since an inquiry into the plaintiff's ability to pay is mandated
by most courts which have dealt with this matter, it is clear that
certification will be denied in many cases due to lack of funds. In
order to avoid this result, some plaintiffs have sought to have their
attorneys pay for the costs of suit with the proviso that the client
will repay the attorney upon recovery from the defendant. There is
nothing unethical about an arrangement of this sort. The Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly authorizes the lawyer to ad-
vance the costs of the suit when his client would otherwise be unable
to prosecute the case." At the same time, however, the disciplinary
rules specify that the client must remain ultimately responsible for
payment of costs and expenses. 9 This requirement poses a dilemma
with regard to advancement of funds. In theory, the client will pay
the attorney from the recovery, but if there is no recovery, reim-
bursement may be impossible. That the attorney's reimbursement
is dependent upon recovery might be taken as indicative of mainte-
nance or solicitation of the class suit by the attorney rather than the
client, in contravention of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
58. ABA CODE, supra note 60, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-103(B) provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation,
a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except
that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court
costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of
obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable
for such expenses.
Ethical Consideration (EC) 5-7 states that the possible adverse effect of financial interest on
the exercise of the attorney's free judgment renders advancement of costs undesirable. Ethical
Consideration (EC) 5-8 specifically recognizes that the practice may, however, prove neces-
sary as "the only way a client can enforce his cause of action."
59. Id. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-103(B); see note 62 infra.
60. Id. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-103(A) prohibits an attorney's acquisition of"a proprie-
tary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client."
This rule is subject to the exception set forth in 5-103(B) for advancement of funds. See note




If the court were to find that the attorney had a proprietary interest
in the action, such unethical conduct could prevent certification of
the class regardless of the fact that the financial capability require-
ment was satisfied.6'
Three lower federal courts62 have held that without evidence of
maintenance or solicitation, any inquiry into the plaintiff's financial
condition is irrelevant once the plaintiff's attorney has expressed his
intention of advancing to plaintiffs all the costs of the suit. Relaxa-
tion of the courts' scrutiny of the representative's financial condi-
tion in this instance reflects judicial awareness of the fact that fail-
ure to allow such agreements would doom many class claims from
the start. Although the court should permit an attorney to advance
costs, it will nevertheless question the class plaintiff concerning his
arrangement with the lawyer in order to determine whether the
agreement indicates that the attorney is maintaining the action.63
Consequently, in Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 4
the court ordered the plaintiff to answer specific questions regarding
the payment of costs in order to elicit this information.5 Another
61. Comment, Ethical Obligations of the Attorney Under Rule 23-A buses and Reforms,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 224 (1974). Cf. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65
F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1766 (1975 Supp.), where the commentators suggest as an alternative to
dismissal, disciplinary action should be taken against the lawyer and a remedial notice sent
to the class. In Korn v. Franchord Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972), the attorney was
removed and replaced by "ethical," counsel.
62. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634 (N.D. Pa. 1973).
63. The questioning may not, however, extend to compulsion of divulgence of
confidential communications. Thus, the attorney-client privilege may prevent an in-depth
inquiry. See Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379, 386 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
64. 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D.Pa. 1973).
65. Id. at 638.
The court ordered the following questions, unanswered at an earlier deposition, to be
answered by the plaintiff:
Q. Have you agreed to pay your attorneys' legal fees for the work that they
perform for you?
Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you agreed to pay the legal costs involved in this suit if
there should be any?
Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you agreed to reimburse your attorneys any legal costs
they might incur in the prosecution of this action?
Q. Dr. Stavrides, have you been told that you may be required to pay the cost
involved in the prosecution of this action?
Q. Could you tell me the first time when this question of cost of the lawsuit ever
arose or was ever discussed?
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district court" agreed that such an inquiry was relevant, but em-
phatically held that without an independent showing of mainte-
nance and solicitation, the plaintiff's own financial condition is
irrelevant.
Of course, were the questions concerning plaintiffs' understand-
ing of their fee and costs arrangement to reveal a widespread
expectation among plaintiffs that they were free from ultimate
liability for funds advanced by counsel, or any other evidence
that plaintiffs' counsel were maintaining this suit, then perhaps
the extent of plaintiffs' assets would become relevant as suppor-
tive evidence in determining whether plaintiffs' counsel were eth-
ically adequate representatives of the class. But until some inde-
pendent evidence is brought to this Court's attention we can see
no purpose to be served by the costly and time consuming process
of inquiring into plaintiffs' financial status. 7
Even when evidence of unethical conduct is absent, an agree-
ment by the attorney to advance costs will be invalid if the plaintiff
is clearly unwilling or unable to reimburse the attorney." Judge
Atkins of the Southern District of Florida addressed this problem:
[T]he deposition testimony reveals that the plaintiff will not
willingly advance more than a few thousand dollars. Is the Court
required to believe that they will willingly guarantee reimburse-
ment of an amount possibly in excess of the outer limits defined
in their respective depositions should the cause of action fail?
And even if this representation is made, could not the Court look
beyond it to determine whether, should that eventuality ever
result, any attempt to collect on that guarantee would be doomed
from the start. 9
The plaintiff's willingness to repay his attorney becomes a salient
factor in considering certification. If reimbursement is impossible,
the plaintiff may be considered an inadequate representative due to
his projected inability to pay.70 Thus, the attorney's willingness to
advance costs is not the solution to guaranteeing financial ability
in many cases where the plaintiffs do not have the resources to meet
66. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
67. Id. at 385-86.
68. See P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).




rule 23(a)(4) themselves. Such an agreement may be defeated by a
showing of maintenance and solicitation, or by demonstration that
the plaintiff remains unable or unwilling to reimburse his attorney.
Hence, the advancement device does not easily circumvent the fi-
nancial requirements and consequently does not increase the avail-
ability of the class suit to relatively poor plaintiffs.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule 23(a)(4) requirement of adequate representation
emerged from obscurity in the wake of the landmark Eisen deci-
sions. Federal district courts that have been confronted with the
issue of adequate representation after Eisen have required a showing
of financial ability in order to satisfy rule 23(a)(4).7' Those courts
have interpreted the Eisen mandate that plaintiff pay the 23(c)(2)
costs as precedent for their indications that the plaintiff must also
be able to meet the financial responsibility inherent in 23(a)(4).
These decisions reflect a realistic judicial concern with protection
of the interests of the absent class members. Concomitantly, how-
ever, the decisions have had the perverse effect of preventing adjudi-
cation of certain class claims, thereby allowing defendants to escape
judicial restraint of their actions. To circumvent this effect, one
federal court has narrowed the size of the class to comport with the
financial ability of the plaintiff.72 However, this is not feasible in all
class actions. 3 Cases holding that the class plaintiff must pay all the
costs of the suit including notice may be the death knell for future
class actions. The Tenth Circuit recognized the fatal effect of the
financial requirement and, therefore, in its Sanderson decision re-
fused to follow it.74 However, as discussed above, it is contended that
the soundness of the Sanderson decision is dubious since in reaching
71. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
72. P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973), where due to the
plaintiff's limited resources, the judge reduced the size of the class by restricting it geographi-
cally.
73. In Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 433 (W.D. Mo. 1973) the court,
relying solely on Eisen II, 479 F.2d 1005 (1973), argumentatively assumed that it could
geographically reduce the size of the class to a manageable level. Even with the reduced size,
however, "the plaintiff would [only] be able to finance notice to the . . . class" and this is
just "the tip of the iceberg." Finding the plaintiff unable to support the financial burden of
properly maintaining the lawsuit, the court condluded the plaintiffs had not shown an ability
to protect adequately the interests of the class and dismissed the action.
74. Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F. 2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
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it, the court ignored the rationale behind a financial capability re-
quirement.
In still other cases the harsh effects of the rule were alleviated
where the court allowed the class attorney to advance costs." These
decisions are also indicative of judicial awareness of the rule's ad-
verse effect. However, even in situations where the attorney agrees
to advance the costs, the class remains ultimately responsible.76
This practice raises collateral questions of adequacy which may
themselves defeat the motion to certify the class."
Overall, the requirement that a class representative be finan-
cially able to represent the class has reduced the incentive of poten-
tial plaintiffs for bringing class actions. This is exemplified by
Eisen IV itself. There, while the plaintiff's damages only amounted
to $70.00, the class damages totalled millions. However, the plaintiff
was less than willing to pay a $315,000 notice cost to adjudicate his
$70.00 claim as required by the decision, so the action could not
continue. The result was that the defendant was safeguarded from
attacks on its alleged illegality since no single plaintiff had sus-
tained sufficient damages to warrant payment of the notice costs.
Rather than relenting from stringent requirements imposed by
Eisen IV, the courts are adding to the already onerous burden con-
fronting the class plaintiff.5 Unless measures are taken to reverse
the recent trend, the large class action seems doomed.
The dilemma is that imposition of weighty financial responsi-
bilities under 23(c)(2) and 23(a)(4) may simultaneously promote
and inhibit due process and protection for absent class members.
Imposition of financial responsibilities on the class representative
promotes due process and protection for absent members by ensur-
ing notice and adequate representation. However, imposition of
those same financial responsibilities may preclude any adjudication
whatsoever of the class's rights.
A solution for one aspect of the problem specifically, that stem-
ming from actions based on alleged antitrust violations, may result
75. Sayre v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
modified, 169 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But cf. Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Pa. 1973), where the court allowed the defendant to inquire into
possible unethical conduct of plaintiff's counsel who advanced funds for the maintenance of
the action.
76. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-103(B).
77. Id. at (DR) 2-101, (DR) 5-103(A).
78. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
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from recent Congressional legislation. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvement Act of 197611 through its Parens Patriae section
provides an alternative, in antitrust suits, to class action thereby
allowing circumvention of present 23 (a)(4) financial obstacles.
Broadly, the Act authorizes a state attorney general to bring an
action on behalf of the citizens of the state to recover damages
arising from the antitrust violations of price fixing or patent fraud
within the state. The Act is in response to the California v. Frito-
Lay case."° In Frito-Lay, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that California could not maintain a parens
patriae case even though failure to allow the suit meant that the
alleged wrong would probably go unredressed since no citizen had
a claim large enough to justify bringing a class suit against the
defendant. The House recognized the inefficiency of the class suit
as a vehicle for consumer antitrust cases. The Committee Notes
discuss the result in Eisen and conclude that in broad consumer
antitrust cases the only effective means of prosecution is through a
generalized figure, specifically the State Attorney General."
Nonantitrust class action grievants, however, are still faced
with the difficulties posed by 23(a)(4) financial requirements. An
amendment to rule 23 providing that the prevailing plaintiff recover
all litigation costs, including discovery, notice costs, and attorney's
fees, may serve to alleviate a small measure of the harsh conse-
quences which will follow upon the impending financial condition
rule. At least such an amendment might provide incentive for an
affluent prospective class plaintiff as he would presumably be more
willing to pay the heavy costs of suit knowing he would be reim-
bursed if successful. However, less affluent class plaintiffs who are
unable to pay the costs of suit at the outset would not be assisted
by this amendment. Their predicament under the judicially im-
posed financial requirements of rule 23 merits legislative considera-
tion lest the availability of the class action as a possible avenue for
redress of grievances be too severely limited.
79. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
80. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
81. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ANTITRUST PARENS PATRIAE ACT, H.R. REP. No. 94-
499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1975).
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